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Abstract. Fifty years ago, Jesse Jackson joined the S.C.L.C. and rose rapidly to become 
one of this country‟s major advocates of black capitalism. Far less well known is his 
interest in finance and credit for African Americans that suggests his prescience about the 
decline of industrial capitalism. Focusing on Jackson‟s early civil rights activity in Chicago, 
this paper charts the initial stages through which Martin Luther King‟s young pupil rapidly 
became a staunch supporter of black economic power, strongly committed to a wealth-
transfer agenda, while most of the other civil rights and labor leaders showed more interest 
in a just distribution of income. Abandoning the stereotypical image of Jackson in his early 
years, an image limiting him to an ambitious activist interested in bargains and with little 
inclination for analysis of the economic reality of his times, this paper addresses Jackson‟s 
forward way of thinking. His growing expertise in money and finance made him one of the 
few civil rights leaders who genuinely grasped the functioning of the post-industrial 
economy and constituted the true wellspring of his later pan-Africanism and economic 
policies.  
Keywords: Jesse Jackson, Economic thought, Operation Breadbasket, S.C.L.C., Black 
capitalism. 
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1. Introduction 
esse Jackson joined the staff of the Southern Christian Leadership Council 
(S.C.L.C.) in 1965.
i
He was twenty-four years old, the youngest of King‟s 
aides. Coinciding with Martin Luther King‟s arrival in Chicago one year later, 
Jackson was appointed head of the Chicago office of Operation Breadbasket 
(henceforth “Breadbasket”; Chappell, 2014; Colton, 1980; Frady, 1996; Landess & 
Quinn, 1985; McKissack, 1989; Reynolds, 1985; Stone, 1979; Timmerman, 2002; 
Wilkinson, 1990). In 1967 he became Breadbasket‟s national director (Abernathy, 
1989; Beltramini, 2013; Massoni, 1989; Ralph 1994, 2006; Young, 1996). 
Breadbasket was a program sponsored by the S.C.L.C. and established in 1962 to 
fight economic discrimination against African Americans in Atlanta. Influenced by 
the example of Reverend Leonard Sullivan in Philadelphia, the organization aimed 
to use the bargaining power of African American church leaders and their 
congregations to foster “selective buying” (boycotts) as a means to pressure white 
businesses to open up private sector jobs to blacks. Jackson energized the 
organization‟s standard repertoire, fighting for economic opportunities for black 
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people. He placed Breadbasket at the center of the emerging black capitalism in 
Chicago, the nation‟s most vibrant black economy (Walker, 1999; 2009). After a 
feud with King‟s successor at the S.C.L.C., Ralph David Abernathy, Jackson left 
the organization and in December 1971 launched his own Operation P.U.S.H. (then 
Rainbow P.U.S.H.), maintained a focus on economic empowerment of poor and 
black communities.  
The paper is divided in two parts. The first part surveys Jackson‟s contributions 
to the black cause, including the development of black business in Chicago, 
addresses Jackson‟s vision of black business and consumer markets within the 
United States, and investigates the difference between wealth and income 
inequality. The second part assesses his early economic thought, particularly the 
evolution from economic rights to black capitalism in a post-industrial age 
(Beltramini, 2014).   
This paper‟s focus is not to decipher the results of Jackson's thoughts or actions, 
only to analyze the intellectual substance of them. Accordingly, this paper does not 
provide non-theoretical and non-rhetorical examples of Jackson‟s leadership, 
although material examples of what Breadbasket and Operation PUSH actually 
accomplished would be necessary to sustain the idea that Jackson was an effective 
leader. This paper highlights several thoughts that can be accurately and fairly 
attributed to Jackson‟s understanding of capitalist market forces and the importance 
of adopting a variety of wealth transfer strategies to that reality, rather than stating 
Jackson‟s acting role on the emergence of black capitalism. 
 
2. Jackson’s View of Black Capitalism 
Breadbasket changed under Jackson‟s leadership. He moved Breadbasket 
beyond traditional civil rights platforms of desegregation and voting rights and 
addressed issues such as black employment and access to capital, the latter being 
the main source of his concerns. Jackson agreed with the S.C.L.C. leadership that 
employment was a crucial target in the quest to combat economic inequality, but 
unlike King and Abernathy, he assumed that employment discrimination came 
together with credit discrimination. In fact, during the “golden age of capitalism” 
and before the legislations of 1968 and 1974, whites attained mortgages and car 
financing much more easily that blacks.
ii
Jackson believed that rather than the 
simple desire to have a job and end poverty, black families yearned to be a part of 
consumer society, and in particular to have access to credit, as in the final years of 
the postwar boom credit was as important for black families as was income. 
Jackson envisioned a campaign for the extension of credit to blacks and portrayed 
consumer credit as a basic right that should be applied to the black minority 
(Riddick, 1967). This was the very core of Jackson‟s view about credit 
discrimination: there was plenty of evidence that even poor black families, amid 
the affluence of the 1960s, wanted to be accepted as members of American 
consumer society. Economic historian Louis Hyman argues that riots were more 
often an opportunity to burn the credit records rather than get free merchandising. 
His point creates a simple and interesting link between credit and ghetto consumers 
(Hyman, 2011b, p. 201). In a consumer society based on credit, even stable salaries 
did not assure black families the possibility to purchase a house or a car. Although 
at that time Chicago was the black capital of the country, and a growing middle 
class was moving toward prosperity, Jackson acknowledged that too many black 
families were still isolated from mass consumption. In the urban daily life of 
Chicago‟s South Side, credit cards were unknown, mortgage requests were 
constantly declined, and credit access at ghetto retailers quite expensive.
iii
 Hyman 
(2011b, p. 210) points out that “Urban retailers, unable to resell their customers‟ 
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debts, charged higher prices both for cash and for credit purchases.”iv Examining 
the intersection of income and credit in everyday life, Jackson looked at black 
families‟ circumstances and tried to extend modern lending possible to them. But 
since the relationship between a borrower and a lender assumes a use of the credit, 
a network of black home-builders, car dealers, publishers, and consumer goods 
manufacturers would benefit of the black community‟s entrée into the consumer 
society.  
In Jackson‟s view, civil rights leaders should find a way to enable black 
capitalism to access affordable credit and low-rate interest finances, all in order to 
build the financial infrastructure of a black economy that may support home and 
car purchases and any other consumer desires of American black families. Black-
owned banks with sufficient funds might provide the access to credit that white-
owned banks denied. Jacksons‟ vision of financial resources for black-owned 
banks, black-owned urban mortgage lending, and small business loans was crucial, 
because historically, most black enterprises had been small, undercapitalized, and 
in constant danger of insolvency (McCraw, 2000, p, 103). If one of the top 
priorities of the civil rights movement was increasing the economic advancement 
of black people, Jackson believed, its leaders would worry less about employment 
and more about financial infrastructures. Already in May 1966, Jackson (1966, p. 
16) made his point in an internal report to Andrew Young:  
Another problem that Operation Breadbasket is discussing is the problem to 
securing decent finance and credit (…) We can find a bank such a Seaway 
National Bank, which is Negro owned and directed, as well as sympathetic to 
the Negro financial and credit problem, and make that into a major bank. We 
could do that by a mass transference of funds of churches and members of the 
congregations from downtown white owned banks to one, maybe two banks. 
In that way we can create a major Negro financial institution that will be a 
source of economic activity for investment, decent credit, and loans that 
Negroes in the slums now have no access to for creative venture.  
He tried to convince black consumers, clergymen, and families to take their 
money out of the banks in Chicago downtown (the white-owned banks outside the 
ghetto) and put it in black banks in the ghetto. He recognized that it was asking 
them to “go through an entire psychological revolution,” as black people did not 
trust black banks. In fact, black banks were natural candidates for insolvency and 
bankruptcy. Jackson also made the point that not only black politicians, but also 
key black business operators and emerging entrepreneurs had their money in white 
banks downtown, and this fact, that their economic base was outside of the ghetto, 
was the reason Chicago‟s black leadership was insensitive to the needs of the black 
community (Llorens, 1967).  
The original idea soon evolved. While the goal of one or two black-owned 
financial institutions remained, the source of funds would become black 
businesspeople, rather than churchmen and congregations. To this end, the program 
actively sought to obtain deposits for the Seaway National Bank and the 
Independence Bank of Chicago, predominantly black banks that were founded in 
the mid-1960s. A business owner‟s committee was formed to urge black 
entrepreneurs, bankers, and professionals to use the black-owned banks and 
savings and loan associations. On December 31, 1966, Seaway National had total 
resources of $7.4 million and the Independence Bank of Chicago $6.1 million. A 
year later, the figures were $12.6 million and $9.0 million, respectively, for a 
combined increase in assets of 60 percent. The president of Seaway National, 
Howard Algar, stated that of his bank‟s $5.2 million increase in deposits around 10 
percent came either directly or indirectly through the efforts of Breadbasket. He 
also pointed out that Seaway had recently made a $500,000 rehabilitation loan to a 
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black mortgage banker. Moreover, Jackson pointed out that also the government 
was responsible for lending, it was supposed to lend capital to black businessmen 
“according to the soundness of the idea” (Kretchmer, 1969, p. 110). Promptly, 
Illinois State Treasurer Adlai Stevenson III deposited state funds in Seaway 
National, Independence Bank of Chicago and in other three savings and loan 
associations, which he described as “serving the extraordinary needs of Negro 
neighborhoods.” He acknowledged Jesse Jackson and Breadbasket as a source of 
encouragement. The banks were reported to have received $300,000 each in state 
deposits (Ewen, 1968, p. 64; “More State Funds Urged for Negro Banks: Operation 
Breadbasket Flyer,” 1967).  
Later, the source of funds would become white-owned companies under the 
threat of boycotts. Jackson negotiated with white-owned businesses to hire African 
Americans to work in stores located in black areas, deposit funds in black-owned 
banks, and enlist the services of black contractors, agencies, and advertising firms. 
During the first half of the century, black entrepreneurs had focused on black 
customers (Walker, 2009; Weems, 1998). Such a strategy seemed to be expedient 
for self help. Jackson acknowledged that for black entrepreneurs to cater only to 
membersof their own race put them at a disadvantage, but rather than envisioning 
black business‟s increased access to white markets as a possible boost for business 
growth, he developed a new idea (McCraw, 2000, p. 104). Somehow, Jackson 
thought, capital had to be diverted from white corporations, banks, retailers, and 
then transferred to black businesses. Breadbasket openly mentioned “credit 
gougers, entrepreneurial markups and price inflated-short selling on all types of 
goods or services.”  
The companies [like GM] will lend us the money to buy cars, which leads to 
profits for them only. They could lend us the money to buy agencies 
[dealerships], but they won‟t, because that would let us profit also. (Riddick, 
1967, p. 7)   
Jackson made a similar point in a later interview. For Jackson, consumer credit 
to black families was an economic area that black lenders must control. 
General Motors, you will not sell cars in the black community unless you 
guarantee us [Operation Breadbasket] a franchise [dealership] here next 
year and help us finance it. (Kretchmer, 1969, p. 108) 
The centerpiece of Jackson‟s Breadbasket agenda was a mugging - a 
multimillion- dollar forcible wealth transfer from white business to black business 
that constituted the backbone of the city‟s black community.v This took the form of 
boycotts of white-owned ventures and a patronage for black-owned businesses.  
Jackson‟s wealth-transfer agenda quite inevitably attracted bias from white 
executives and accusation of cronyism from the press, while becoming a major 
source of controversy and tension within the Breadbasket leadership. At the 
beginning, King was, quite simply, enthusiastic about Jackson‟s leadership. 
Breadbasket was the S.C.L.C.‟s first effort to address the crisis of joblessness that 
became one of King‟s principal preoccupations in the mid-1960s. However, when 
the transition from work integration to economic development, smooth at first, 
gained traction, King openly expressed “grave doubts” about Breadbasket‟s aim to 
merge civil rights and black business. The shift left him ambivalent about the 
program, and he actually shared his concerns with the executive director of 
S.C.L.C., Bill Rutherford, regarding the appearance of replacing “white bastards 
with black bastards” (King, 1967a; 1967b; 1967c).  
Jackson‟s drift toward black capitalism troubled King. Concerned that it failed 
to address black poverty, labor exploitation, and political exclusion, King told a 
March 1967 Chicago Breadbasket meeting that a white man who preached black 
capital accumulation to poor people reminded him of somebody “telling you to lift 
Journal of Economic and Social Thought 
JEST, 3(3), E. Beltramini. p.333-348. 
337 
yourself up by your bootstraps” while he was standing on your foot. In the last 
months of his life, King repeatedly clashed with Jackson. He accused Jackson of 
pursuing a personal agenda and supporting black capitalists rather than the black 
poor. If the first accusation was the reason for their last disagreement, which 
happened just a couple of days before King‟s assassination, it is the second that 
was most devastating and left more enduring damage. King “was quite rough on 
Jesse,” Andrew Young remembered, because he believed that adequate jobs would 
have to come through the public sector, while “Breadbasket was essentially a 
private sector program.” While King was often sympathetic to minority small 
business owners, he never championed their cause. In September 1967, King heard 
from a gift shop owner in Chicago facing bankruptcy and asking for King‟s help 
with the Small Business Administration to make up the capital shortfall. The owner 
thanked King for his participation in the “fight for jobs,” but insisted, “if we do not 
now begin the establishment of businesses, we may very well find that in another 
100 years we will be no better off in our fight for economic power and human 
dignity” (Fairclough, 2011, p. 354; “Fannie G. Perryman to King,” 1967, ).vi 
The dominant narrative that emphasizes the clash of character and strategies 
between the two leaders only scratches the surface of the economic rationales 
between King and Jackson.
vii
 Their disagreement remains a far more complex story 
still in need to be articulated. King made income inequality the centerpiece of his 
last campaigns, focused on closing the income gap between rich and poor 
Americans. When he debated about income inequality, he usually defined it as the 
share of national income earned by the “haves.” Jackson‟s central concern was 
wealth inequality, which he defined as a high concentration of wealth in a 
relatively small number of white businesses and financial institutions. King and 
Jackson were fighting two different types of economic inequality. The network of 
civil rights and labor leaders who led the movement in the 1960s cast income 
distribution as the focal point of their economic agenda pointing to a combination 
of factors. The main factor was the economic zeitgeist, which emphasized long-
term policy aiming at achieving balanced growth (a specific type of economic 
growth that is not affected by the boom and bust nature of economic cycles) with 
full employment and accepting a budget deficit until full employment was 
achieved. Leaders such as King, Rustin, and Randolph recognized that long-term 
balanced growth could not necessary ensure full employment and demanded 
government remedies for structural unemployment, unemployment that was not 
dependent on the status of effective demand but rather technological change. By 
contrast, Jackson‟s inequality concern centered on wealth inequality. Jackson used 
the word “capital” to describe all forms of wealth. He showed a clear fascination 
for, and an evident appreciation of capital. “I keep telling you that capitalism 
without capital is just plain ism – and we can‟t live off ism” (Llorens, 1967, p. 82). 
He believed that capital flows were more important than minimum wage, as capital 
was more concentrated than income. In this scenario, blacks - who had no access to 
capital -- could never hope to become as affluent as whites. Jackson predicted that 
only a rebalance of wealth distribution could lead black communities into 
prosperity. Ultimately, he conceived the economic development of the black 
community, including the organization of black business, in terms of finance rather 
than jobs. Economic discrimination, for the young Jackson, was more a matter of 
unequal access to capital flows than to income. Jackson apparently recognized a 
difference between an unjust distribution of income, which policymakers can 
eventually address with policies of full employment, and an unjust distribution of 
wealth (“capital”), which can be fixed through a corporate wealth-transfer agenda.  
Certainly King was enthusiastic about Breadbasket, thrilled by its results in 
terms of jobs, income, and contracts, but he nonetheless concluded that these 
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results were insufficient to achieve the final goal of full employment. In other 
words, full employment was too big a target to be accomplished through a program 
with limited resources like Breadbasket. Accordingly, the economic intervention of 
the federal government was not only desirable, but indispensable, and to be 
pursued at the cost to promote a paradigm shift from American liberalism to 
Swedish social democracy.
viii
 King saw Jackson‟s single-minded pursuit of black 
capitalism as disturbing, so ideologically distant from King‟s own social 
democratic agenda. They disagreed on the basic premise, that black 
underdevelopment was a product of capitalist development; consequently, they 
disagreed on the solution. King argued that in order for African Americans to 
advance economically, they would have to be integrated into the dominant 
economic structure in American capitalism once that structure had been changed. 
Jackson proposed black-controlled economic institutions in dialogue with white-
controlled economic institutions, within the context of greater American 
capitalism. In fact, Jackson was convinced that most African Americans did not 
contest capitalism, only exclusion from it. They did not complain because they 
were part of the capitalistic system, but because they had no access to capital. 
While King was a strong supporter of New Deal capitalism, that is, the federal 
government is actively involved in handling the economy through a regulated form 
of capitalism, Jackson openly embraced what he called “the post-New Deal-
Keynesian capitalistic system,” a vision of financial capitalism. He separated his 
vision from the traditional understanding of capitalism as production and jobs, and 
defined the kind of capitalist he was and why the black community needed it. In a 
Breadbasket internal report dated May 20, 1967, Jackson explicitly invited the 
whole black business community, not only Breadbasket, to embrace the “policy 
and logic” and “benefits of the free competitive enterprise” elaborated in a previous 
document (Riddick, 1967). 
Jackson envisioned Breadbasket as an engine to promote black capitalism 
because he recognized the multiplicity of connections between consumer 
capitalism and financial capitalism and applied this vision to the ghetto 
community. In just a few years, Jackson was able to in Chicago articulate a 
disillusioned analysis of the race divide and proposed an innovative, integrationist 
approach to American capitalism.  He identified clearly the potential of creating a 
connection between the ghetto economy and black business and was committed to 
making this possible connection work.
ix
 He acknowledged the underlying reality of 
the inner black city business. Insular, depredated, with limited financial resources 
to approach the consumer, many black businesses were isolated from the larger 
mainstream of American capitalism. Jackson adopted the metaphor of the “island:” 
The ghetto is an island. Every decision on the island is made by white people 
(…) Black people control nothing in the ghetto. The island has to exist in a 
capitalistic system without any capital. Any area of capitalism without a 
circular flow of capital is a slum (…) many whites have made kind overtures 
but nothing has been done systematically to start capital flowing into the 
island. Even the War on Poverty does not bank here. (Ewen, 1968, pp. 24-25, 
49-54, 64) 
According to Jackson, the ghetto is not separated from capitalism; rather, the 
ghetto is clearly part of capitalism (a point that Jackson reiterates during his 
career). What makes the ghetto a slum is the absence of “a circular flow of capital,” 
which, in turn, happens because the “black people control nothing in the ghetto.” In 
other words, the ghetto is not a matter of political choice or social degeneration, but 
rather of financial power. Jackson established a mains-end chain that resembles the 
more radical wing of the Black Power movement, but set his sights on the Black 
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community's control of its own organizations and institutions as a means to pursue 
financial power. He stated clearly this position: 
The essential purpose of Breadbasket is to have blacks control the basic 
resources of their community. We want to control the banks, the trades, the 
building constructions and the education of our children. This desire on our 
part is a defensive strategy evolved in order to stop whites from controlling 
our community and removing the profits and income that belong to black 
people. Our programs are dictated by the private-enterprise economy in 
which we find ourselves. (Kretchmer, 1969, p. 96) 
Jackson elucidates the main benefit of racial activities to control and manage 
capital flows, that is, to redirect capital flows to the ghetto, while explaining that 
such a control should be pursued as a response to the perceived financial 
vulnerability of the black ghetto community. The reference to “the private-
enterprise economy” is important in the economy of Jackson‟s logic, as he sees 
capital controls and capital flow management not as a policy tool but as a result of 
a power struggle. As blacks lived in a private-enterprise economy, the 
redistribution of wealth was not a matter of governmental policy but of racial 
power struggle.  
Jackson was committed to making every effort to construct a bridge between the 
ghetto economy and American corporate capitalism. He positioned himself on the 
opposite side of the civil rights leaders who continued to overestimate 
American capitalism's potential for growth and liberalism‟s appetite for 
government spending. He also campaigned for full employment, guaranteed annual 
income, housing, education, expanded medical care, and social insurance. During 
the Johnson Administration, plans for monumental public spending based on 
economic planning were proposed by civil and labor leaders such Whitney Young, 
Bayard Rustin, and A. Philip Randolph. Later on, Abernathy asked for more 
federal funds for the poor, although in the inflationary economic cycle of late 
1960s to early 1970s, federal funds for providing good-paying jobs, well-equipped 
schools, and affordable housing to black people became increasingly rare. While 
Johnson never considered the option of economic planning, Jackson doubted that 
anyone within the silent majority coalition of the Nixon administration would 
promote an agenda of economic development. King‟s vision of a full-blown 
welfare state also seemed unlikely with the presidency in Nixon‟s hands and the 
Johnson Administration‟s Great Society programs under attack.x Largely due to the 
increasing costs of the Vietnam War and the decline of the government funds, the 
black community had to learn how to reduce their economic dependence on white 
liberals as well as central government and to increase their autonomy. Thus 
Jackson came to identify the possibility of merging black autonomy and economic 
advancement, Black Power and capitalism. He articulated a moderate version of 
Black Power as a rationale for black capitalistic ventures, as well as the 




Jackson envisioned the reverse of the traditional Black Power ideology, which 
emphasized the access to economic resources for the creation of black political and 
cultural institutions. In Jackson‟s view, the establishment of black institutions was 
critical to black economic self-determination. Jackson‟s efforts to turn Black Power 
in Black capitalism and define “Black Power” in explicitly capitalist terms 
represented a strategy of integration through self-determination. Like Booker T. 
Washington – a black icon with whom Jackson has been frequently associated– and 
his followers at the turn of the century, he emphasized racial solidarity, economic 
self-sufficiency, and black self-help, with the prospect of integration. Unlike King, 
he did not work to change American capitalism. He made clear that he had not 
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“changed the hearts of the executives,” only “the behaviors of the corporations” 
(Simms, 1970, p. 19). He proclaimed that justice is the opportunity to share the 
benefits of capitalism with the whole society and one of the goals of the civil rights 
movement was increasing the stake of black people in American capitalism. 
Jackson articulated his quiet and moderate understanding of Black Power ideology 
during the Saturday morning meetings at Operation Breadbasket, when he 
emphasized his view of community self-help organizations, improvement of 
communities, pursuance of self-reliance, and economic and political independence 
from white authorities. The black community had to learn how to reduce its 
economic dependence on white liberals as well as central government, and to 
increase their autonomy. They had to definitively change the relationship with 
whites. What might have seemed an expression of generosity, or a private welfare 
paid by whites, had to instead become a merchant exchange. Not coincidentally, 
Jackson suggested the transfer more of the whites‟ wealth to the economic needs of 
the blacks, often talking of „reciprocity,‟ meaning the need for a relationship 
between equals. He pointed out that the connotation of Black Power in the media 
might be violence, but in fact, Black Power is power sharing. It is equity.
xii
 “We 
want ownership, we want our share, we want investment,” became Jackson‟s 
mantra in the following two decades (“Jesse Jackson Threatens Companies with 
Boycott,” 1985, p. 45).  
 
3. From Economic Rights to Black Capitalism 
As the 1960s unfolded, African American opinion turned increasingly away 
from a liberal integrationist agenda toward an emphasis on black nationalism and 
Pan-Africanism.Accordingly, Jackson counts among black leaders such as 
Malcolm X and Stokely Carmichael, who shifted their attention and showed their 
genuine interest in African affairs. Jackson declared, “We‟ve got African roots and 
we must not deny them” (Jackson, 1972, p. 55). He expanded on a global scale his 
vision of an international independent black community that maintains control of 
its basic resources in a capitalistic system. He stated that “for so long, foreign 
affairs was considered none of the slaves‟ business,” making clear that the 
emancipation and involvement of Black America in business could not be limited 
to domestic issues. Then he located African American business within the broader 
context of global capitalism, stating, “The world is interrelated, and its people are 
interdependent. Independence is an illusion, and isolation is suicidal” (Hatch, 1988, 
p. 65). 
Before an audience of three thousand black nationalists and Pan-Africanists in 
Atlanta in September 1970, during the sessions of the Congress of African People, 
Jackson was adamant about explaining that blacks are part of the capitalistic 
system, even if “morally you are not” (Baraka, 1972).With that, Jackson meant that 
African Americans‟ moral detachment does not allow them to be free from the 
inescapable reality of capitalism. They belong to capitalism despite their will. 
Shifting from government to the markets, Jackson minimized the role of the public 
policy. In fact, Jackson tried to balance the traditional appeal to welfare and 
international economic aid with a more active, positive sense of pride, self-esteem, 
and self-determination. He was simply rephrasing his original point, that “welfare 
[alone] is a form of humiliation” (Kretchmer, 1969, p. 112). He ultimately pointed 
out that without a personal call to action, the black community could easily be 
resigned to the continuing economic crisis and relegated to wait passively for the 
promised efforts of the government. Embracing capitalism was the new phase of 
the civil rights movement.
xiii
 Accordingly, the black community should have moved 
the domestic agenda from civil rights to business advancement and, in the 
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international arena, from “aid to trade” (Marable, 1985, p. 264). What he meant 
was blacks must move from public aid to private trade (“Jesse Jackson Threatens 
Companies with Boycott,” 1985).Jackson was suggesting to trade resources with 
white-owned ventures to foster economic growth for black businesses, build job 
opportunities, and reduce poverty. 
Jackson has never portrait himself as an intellectual, least of all in the economic 
sphere. His formal education in economics was inexistent. He was largely self-
taught and self-formed, a process he accomplished as an emerging subaltern in the 
streets of Chicago‟s South Side. This caused him to commit errors and emphasized 
shortcomings. He was not a systematic thinker, and his ideas, including the 
economic ideas, often remained at the level of initial reflection, although never 
unsophisticated or immature. At the beginning of his career, he was unburdened by 
preconceptions or rigid beliefs. This gave him great strength as a highly articulate 
man of deep intuition. While always an instinctive pro-capital, he saw the 
transformation of the economic landscape and the emergence of finance as a driven 
force of business, and he reacted accordingly. It is not quite surprising, therefore, 
that early on he developed a coherent economic view, which remained consistent.  
In his search for wealth equality, Jackson found himself in an ideological 
netherworld, as the inequality debate in the 1960s was centered on income 
inequality. He looked to the “Black capitalist” ideas of 19th-century leaders like 
Booker T. Washington, and, more recently, of the Congress of Racial Equality 
(CORE) head Roy Innis. Innis, like Jackson, envisioned a “nation within a nation” 
and argued that they must develop “Black control of capitalist instruments” 
(Poinsett, 1969b). Jackson was successful at re-popularizing concepts such as black 
community economic empowerment, self-help through entrepreneurship, a global 
perspective on black entrepreneurship, and corporate business diversity. Many of 
these concepts have their origin in a long history of black intellectual scholarship 
and activism. The roots can be traced to the writings and works of individuals such 
as W. E. B. DuBois, Booker T. Washington, Marcus Garvey, Carter G. Woodson, E. 
Franklin Frazier, and Abram Harris, although the extent of their influence on 
Jackson is difficult to assess. Jackson prolonged this intellectual tradition as an 
influential force in the debate on economic justice by an entire generation – 
perhaps two.  
The level of originality of Jackson‟s economic thought needs to be delimited. 
While Jackson was a pioneer in emphasizing corporate diversity programs, he was 
not alone in this regard. People like Earl Graves with Black Enterprise, 
Congressman Percy Sutton, and many other economic and social entrepreneurs 
were responsible for this action, including the National Minority Supplier 
Development Council. Almost coincidentally, one of the greatest boosts to the 
evolution of minority entrepreneurship occurred as a result of the emphasis on 
black capitalism began under the Nixon Administration in 1968. As a means of co-
opting the emerging black power movement, Nixon was first to introduce 
government affirmative action programs for minority business development. Those 
programs received a further boost under the late Mayor Maynard Jackson‟s 
pioneering policies in the city of Atlanta, which became a national model. The 
programs created access to market opportunities beyond personal service and retail 
enterprises and paved the way for the emergence of large scale construction and 
engineering companies, black-owned businesses in information, communications 
and technology, black professional service enterprises. 
Moreover, Jackson‟s thoughts on economic issues cannot be confused with his 
actual action. Jackson claimed that his activities were instrumental in helping the 
black cause as a whole, including the development of black business in Chicago, 
and framed his involvement in the globalization of black business as definitely a 
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success story. Some of these assertions raise skepticism-- not about whether they 
are in fact true, but rather about the breadth of the impact that is being attributed to 
Jackson‟s activities. For example, Jackson was able to induce the corporations to 
transfer their capital investments from white to black banks. While this was true for 
some institutions in Chicago, it is not generally the case for the nation as a whole. 
In fact, black banks struggled from under capitalization throughout this period: in 
the late 1960s, the total asset value of the 20 black-owned banks was $207 million, 
compared with $500 billion of the 14,000-plus white-owned banks (Poinsett, 
1969a). The same can be said about Jackson‟s advice to increase their lending 
activities to black households and businesses. While Jackson was successful in the 
limited cases cited in the paper, this is miniscule compared to the overall size of 
capital assets in black banks as well as the size of black business capitalization, 
even in 1968. And it is an important testable hypothesis how black-owned banks 
used deposits generated by Jackson‟s activities. Moreover, Jackson‟s business 
associates and network enlarged in the decade following the 1960s were certainly 
visible and influential black entrepreneurs. However, the elements of Jackson‟s 
influence over these individuals and their subsequent activities in the black 
community in support of black entrepreneurship would require a serious 
investigation of Finally, in support of the global black business, Jackson made 
numerous trips abroad to discuss mutual interests in business opportunities. 
However, evidence that a global business strategy and entrepreneurial sector 
emerged within the black community as a result of those trips, would require 
further scrutiny. 
Jackson‟s economic thought can be more properly summarized as an evolution 
from a notion of economic rights within the classic tradition of the civil rights 
movement to the more controversial idea of black capitalism. This evolution 
probably lies in Jackson‟s overall intuition of the ultimate destiny of dissolution of 
the civil rights movement, which was uneasy in an increasing conservative, post-
industrial America.
xiv
He joined a movement still dominated by pre-consumist, pre-
industrial solidarity that was hegemonized by the black church and labor union, 
and tried to articulate the vision of a more diverse movement that was at home with 
finance and entrepreneurship.  
Situated at the convergence of the civil rights movement and the resurgent 
ideology of black capitalism, by the late 1960s Jackson was one of the most 
prominent black leaders to use the strategy of the civil rights movement to spur the 
growth of African American businesses. Jackson showed a declining faith in 
welfare and the coalition of labor, civil rights, and liberal leaders, and he argued 
that economic autonomy was the ultimate goal for the whole black community, 
poor and middle class. He blurred the line between the two in pursuit of an agenda 
to empower the poor and raise the black entrepreneurial class, according to a notion 
of economic justice in which economic rights are assigned to individuals based 
upon their needs or their merits. His alliance of the “merits and needs" was an 
ideological innovation because he kept outside the class (which was then a crucial 
role in defining the ideological horizons the traditional civil rights leaders) and put 
individuals at the center (with their merits and needs) in the selection of priorities 
of social policies. However, rather than deeming a sign of ideological innovation, 
King and other civil rights leaders considered Jackson‟s individualism a sort of 
betrayal.  
Jackson was not the leader who tried to modernize the civil rights movement, 
but rather the leader who sought to identify those who would be the partners of the 
civil rights movement, and eventually the Black Freedom movement, in a post-
industrial era. His economic ideas presuppose the perception of a greater 
anthropological mutation of the society in which the dominant values are no longer 
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those of the church and the unions, but those of the affluent society and consumer 
capitalism. The civil rights movement itself could not escape an encounter with a 
vicious and inexorable post-industrialism. The industrial values of the civil rights 
leaders were vanishing in society at large and evaporating even in their Southern 
roots, replaced by the ideology of hedonistic consumption. Jackson likely 
underestimated the vacuum of values that followed.  
Jackson recognized the impracticality of social-democratic projects. In the late 
1960s, social democracy-style New Deal liberalism was no longer a hegemonic 
political philosophy that could legitimize the hopes of civil rights leaders with the 
government's help. Perhaps the only chance for the full realization of the instances 
of democracy and economic progress established by the civil rights movement lay 
in the market. Although Jackson never rejected the notion of the social welfare 
state and occasionally took advantage of his connections with government 
representatives and political leaders, he acknowledged intellectually the problems 
and limitations of New Deal liberalism early in his career. While he did not go on 
to become the founding father of a neoconservative string within the civil rights 
movement, his refusal to fit himself into the standard liberal categories probably 
contributed to the controversial image and the relative marginalization of his 
influence throughout the 1970s.  
Jackson seemed to recognize the key transformations in the economy that 
marked an end to the industrial era, including the decline of manufacturing's 
centrality to the economy and the rise of services, especially finance. This trend in 
turn placed increasing demands on capital rather than jobs. While the civil rights 
movement and black leaders had long been fighting for equal employment 
opportunity and full employment, sometimes under the urgency of equality, 
Jackson argued that the new economic landscape required a movement that was 
impervious to the constraints of classic fordism. Post-industrial trends position the 
movement to play a significantly more central role in providing financial resources 
to entrepreneurs and an increase in credit to families. Accordingly, Jackson 
articulated a set of ideas that supported the development of black capitalism: 1. 
focusing the struggle for equal rights on economic empowerment at a time when 
the leadership of the struggle was preoccupied with social and political power; 2. 
emphasizing the commonality in aspirations between blacks and whites for 
economic enhancement through capitalist market forces; 3. pioneering a number of 
successful affirmative action and corporate diversity programs, especially in 
Chicago, that were centered on creating broader retail distribution networks for 
black businesses; 4. tapping into and encouraging the nascent aspiration among 
African-Americans to become entrepreneurs; and, 5. promoting the struggle for 
African-American economic community empowerment. 
Although Jackson acknowledged the evolution of American capitalism and 
worked to make the civil rights movement compatible with the incoming post-
industrialism, it is unclear if he fully recognized how these economic 
transformations were likely to create deeper and more intractable cultural and 
political effects within the civil rights movement. In particular, the rise of a 
consumer culture in the 1960s to the 1970s had effectively undermined the 
collective solidarity that fuelled the conscience of the movement and replaced it 
with a hedonistic pursuit of pleasure. Because pleasure is defined in individualistic 
terms, the pursuit of it results in an erosion of the moral bonds that the movement 
had only recently built, shaping a kind of progress that was lacking collective 
values. Consumer culture was nurturing a focus on the centrality of the individual 
and effectively corroded the solidaristic foundations that nurture the basis for civil 
rights movement. On the one side, postindustrial trends position the movement to 
play a significantly more central role in providing financial resources to 
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entrepreneurs and an increase in credit to families; however, just as consuming 
needs were expanding, citizens were increasingly likely to see collective values as 
irrelevant in their own pursuit of happiness. With a solid safety net, middle class 
families were less interested in race equality and more interested in their individual 
satisfaction. Where these two trends converge, an ongoing moral crisis was at 
work, and a new, more individualistic philosophy to justify the extension of civil 
rights was nowhere to be found.  
 
4. Conclusion 
While King and the old guard of the S.C.L.C. called for a universal distribution 
of income, Jackson targeted wealth inequality. He envisioned white-owned 
businesses infusing needed capital into minority-owned businesses, local economic 
development projects, small business advancement, job training, financial and trade 
institutions, and other community programs that would contribute to the 
advancement of the whole black community. He recognized the unfinished 
revolution of the civil rights era, and re-cast the movement within a more limited 
sphere of influence, as the dramatic decline of influence of the civil right 
movement in the second part of the 1960s undermined every trust in the prospect of 
radical change in American society. The critique of modern capitalism that was so 
important for King was largely missed in Jackson‟s view. He expressed a set of 
moderate ideas, essentially reconciled to the existing structure of American 
capitalism, and committed himself to use the art of bargaining to gain economic 
power for the black community. One broad assumption was particularly important 
to Jackson, that the black community‟s greatest problems were rooted in the lack of 
integration with the structure of modern industrial capitalism. Accordingly, he 
aimed to expand the effects of capitalism to blacks previously excluded.  
Jackson adopted a post-industrial interpretation of the civil rights in which the 
final goal of the movement was not employment but finance, and he thus promoted 
the bourgeoisie values of economic autonomy and success of the emerging black 
middle class. Described in biographies and articles as a contradictive personality 
with a kaleidoscopic mind, Jackson could easily describe himself, at least in his 
early days, as a moderate in economics, a liberal in politics, and a conservative in 
culture. This trinity might annoy almost everyone, but Jackson‟s heterodoxy may 
have helped him to see well before the Reagan revolution that American capitalism 
would grapple with the question of the free market and private choices for decades 
to come. He had, by then, rearticulated the classic civil rights narrative, and had 
worked intensively to shape his own peculiar meaning of the struggle for economic 
power. Not surprisingly, he redefined the black struggle for freedom in relation to 
what he considered the central issue of his times: the relation between finance and 
consumer in the modern capitalism. He pursued integration in American capitalism 
through the advancement of black capitalism, although he might or might not have 
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iA preliminary partial version of this article was delivered as a paper at the conference on the 
Histories of American Capitalism, Cornell University, New York, November 2014.  
iiThe expression “golden age of capitalism” refers the period after World War Two, with its sustained 
growth and high employment rate. See: Stephen A. Marglin and Juliet B. Schor, The Golden Age of 
Capitalism: Reinterpreting the Postwar Experience (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). As for 
the privileged access to credit, see a „Situation Report‟ published by Time, since World War II, 
which sustains that government has financed only 800,000 urban units, where black people were 
concentrated, while insuring the financing of 10 million suburban homes, where white families 
were moving. “Situation Report,” Time, April 6, 1970, 55. As for the expansion of consumer credit, 
see the epochal passage from an industrial to a financial form of capitalism. The changes that were 
occurring in the larger structure of American capitalism, notably that in the second half of the 1960s, 
it was more profitable to lend money to facilitate consumption than to lend funds to invest in 
expanded production. Not coincidentally, consumer credit industry soon boomed and replaced 
capital equipment loan and legislation opened up access to consumer credit in 1968 and 1974. 
iiiAccording to the „Situation Report,‟ black families paid more than white families for comparable 
houses and were more likely to live in substandard housing in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
“Situation Report,” Time, April 6, 1970, 55. 
ivFor an expanded version of the topic, see: Louis Hyman, Debtor Nation: The History of America in 
Red Ink (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011).   
v Jackson never quantifies the wealth-transfer. In the same period, James Foreman demanded $500 
million (later upped to $3 billion), while Roy Innis requested $6 billion. Source: Alex Poinsett, 
“Movement seeks broad-based control of black economy by blacks instead of whites,” Ebony, 
August 1969, 154. 
viJackson‟s problem in those early days was really about believability and connection with the 
challenges of mainstream civil rights movement. He often was not believed to work for the cause of 
economic justice. Jackson didn‟t seem to know how to respond to was essentially a moral critique 
with his economics. 
vii Scholars have typically explained the divergence between King and Jackson in terms of unaligned 
tempers and clash of character. See for example Garrow, who maps the main points of divergence 
by arguing that Breadbasket was designed to improve the quality of life for working class blacks, as 
well as unemployed black people, and describes Jackson assuming the role of black business 
champion. However, Garrow does not investigate in detail the causes of this dialectic between the 
two leaders, and prefers to link it to differences of character, and to King‟s doubts about Jackson‟s 
personality and goals. David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King, Jr., and the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (New York: W. Morrow, 1986), 585. 
viii The story goes that King initiated in 1966 a series of civil rights campaigns that he thought were 
going to turn the economic injustice around, but they didn‟t work because the federal government 
remained unimpressed. He subsequently attacked American capitalism as it was. He blamed the 
system for the economy. He shifted the focus of the debate on economic injustice from being about 
federal policies to being about capitalism.  
ix The West Side Organization is primarily a “Grass Roots” neighborhood representative, and it is this 
capacity they will serve the businessmen sponsors, and the neighborhood needs.” Operation 
Breadbasket West Side organization salesman training program proposals; sources of income and 
budget for Operation Breadbasket in Chicago, 05/08/1967, 9 pp, Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference Records, MLKC, Box 172:9. 
xNixon‟s efforts to foster minority business enterprise have been studied in depth. During the Nixon 
Administration, a short but unambiguous convergence of interests between black capitalism and 
pro-business conservatism emerged, as parts congealed around the idea of economic self-
determination. While black militants and activists saw self-determination as an expression of racial 
pride, all-black institutions, and economic independence, white conservatives associated it with 
ideals of self-reliance, private enterprise, and individualism. In summary, black capitalism and 
affirmative action (whatever notion of “proportion” it ended adopting), played down the importance 
of integration and color-blind strategies, and replaced nondiscrimination and anti-poverty programs 
as effective strategies and programs to promote racial coexistence. 
xiFor this idea, I am indebted to Peniel E. Joseph, Dark Days, Bright Nights: from Black Power to 
Barack Obama (New York: Basic Civitas Books, 2010) and personal conversation with Peniel E. 
Joseph, May 2011, Atlanta, GA. 
xiiThe original quotation is: “The connotation of Black Power in the media was violence. The fact is 
Black Power was power sharing. It was equity.” See Madison Davis Lacey, Jr. and Henry Hampton, 
“Eyes on the Prize II. Interview with Jesse Jackson,” April 11, 1989, accessed September 3, 2012, 
[Rerrieved from].  
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xiiiAt a conference of the New Orleans Business League in July 1982, Jackson argued that “The 
marketplace is the arena for our development.” Cited in Manning Marable, Black American 
Politics: from the Washington Marches to Jesse Jackson (London: Verse Press 1985), 264. 
xiv In 1972, Time magazine quoted Jackson as saying at that time that the traditional civil rights 
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